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1. Nationalism after “really existing socialism”
Inter-ethnic conflicts and minority problems in post communist Central and 
East Europe have been generally linked to nationalism and to the legacies of 
“really existing socialism”1. Tins is true in a more involved fashion. Namely, 
nationalism and its consequences regarding national and other minorities had 
been predominant in all “really socialist” countries before communists seized 
power. Nationalism had infested political life in all of them, especially in the 
period between two World Wars. Communist rule appeared to be non-na­
tionalist and to steer in the opposite direction. However, when it collapsed, 
nationalism not only re-emerged, but did it virulently. As a resistant strain of 
bacteria, it now manifests traits acquired in “real socialism”. It opposes com­
munist ideology and practice but in the same time adapts it or borrows from 
it. It is not surprising, then, to hear nationalists blaming only communism for 
the present disorder (and for the sad state of their minority or majority 
nation), the fewer leftists, both in the region and outside it, putting the blame 
only on the resurrection of pre-World War II nationalism, and still others, 
combining traditional nationalist and Stalinist rhetoric2.
Although there is general agreement that nationalism is prevailing in East 
and Central Europe, curiously enough, nationalists are not entirely proud of 
being nationalist. To be more precise, blatant nationalist statements seldom go 
with an open espousal of nationalism as a doctrine3. Nationalist intellectuals 
are gnawed by die feeling that nationalism, after all, looks intellectually dis­
credited - they say by the communists, but intimately know that political 
nationalism has been, since the end of the 19th century, associated with the 
xenophobic Right and anti-Semitism (Hobsbawm 1992, p. 105). There is ten­
sion between politically extremely effective nationalism at home and its nonac­
ceptance abroad.
1 As many others I feel uneasy when denoting as “communism” social, economic and 
political systems that were introduced and maintained by communist parties in the USSR 
and countries under its control and influence in Europe, Asia and maybe Cuba. What was 
there instituted was done in the name of Marxism, Leninism and socialism but in many 
eyes did not correspond to the communist project Even communist powerholders there - 
albeit for other reasons - refrained from calling it communism: they were only “building” 
the latter. To the great dismay of Western socialists and social-democrats they referred to 
their creation as socialism, with the proviso that their socialism was the only one really 
put to practice. While “communism” tends to be pejorative, “really existing socialism” is 
only ironic and has the advantage of clearly referring to all versions of “applied Marxism- 
Leninism”.
2 In his perspicacious analysis of the statements of leading Serb nationalists Milosevic 
refers to a number of ideas they borrowed from Soviet Stalinism, such as e.g. distaste for 
capitalism, nostalgia for bipolarity and fear of “new world order”. Milosevic, p. 10.
3 The same is with racism, which can be detected in opinion polls and typical racist 
statements by a number of “intellectuals”. When called racist, the latter vehemently reject 




























































































Even nationalists think that “other” (i.e. belonging to another nation) na­
tionalists are bad and dangerous. Pathetic efforts are made either to avoid the 
label of nationalism for one's own attitudes toward one’s ethnic group4 or to 
obtain recognition and political and intellectual support for selected benign or 
“democratic” nationalisms5.
The current preoccupation with nationalism has not been caused only by 
some of its most violent outbursts and the detection of its symptoms in many 
areas, but also by its unexpectedness. Until very recently, it was believed that 
“nationalism is no longer a major vector of historical development” 
(Hobsbawm 1990, p. 163). This was probably done under the influence of suc­
cessful integration in Western Europe and the fact that the other side in the 
Cold War was seen as everything but nationalist.6
The second part of this assessment was obviously wrong. Neglected was the 
paradox of nationalism in “real socialism". Simultaneously it has been a pow­
erful weapon against communism and the only means of dictators and bureau­
cratic elites in decaying communist systems to preserve their power by finding 
new legitimacy and social support. This has been well documented in the cases 
of Ceausescu, Castro and Kim II Sung (Michnik 1990-1991, p.74; Gabanyi 
1990, p. 372). In multinational societies the communist oligarchy promoted 
interethnic conflicts so as to act as arbiter (Djilas 1990, p. 225). Nationalism 
and the Bolshevik version of communism have been intimately linked by col­
lectivism and anti-individualism; this explains the ease with which many for­
mer members of the ruling party became nationalists and the frequent 
“alliance of nationalist populism and party hard-liners” (Denitch 1990, p. XV).
These consequences, but not their dismal reality, can be explained as 
inevitable in decaying totalitarian rule:
4 This is sometimes done by finding “non-nationalist” terms for “bad nationalism”, as 
Mastnak does to differentiate between his (Slovene) nationalism and “...fascism, 
xenophobia, chauvinism, racism, anti-Semitism, politicised ethnocentrism, Blut und 
Boden movements” (Mastnak 1992).
5 This kind of support seems to be sought in particular in Germany and from Germans, in 
the expectation that understanding would be more forthcoming there than elsewhere. 
“German” nationalism, in the sense of ethnonationalism, has been frequently contrasted 
to “French” nationalism, i.e. allegiance to the state. At a meeting in Zagreb some of the 
local scholars attempted to convince their German colleagues, not that nationalism was 
good, but that Croat nationalism was good. They could only elicit some understanding 
for any nationalism in that part of the world, including both Croat and Serb . According 
to the German participants, ethnocracy was inevitable in that part of Europe and it could, 
but would not necessarily, lead to democracy. See Jahn and the reaction of Zenko.
6 To be sure, Hobsbawm refined this statement in the second edition of his book in the 
sense that “nationalism is historically less important” and that “it is no longer, as it were, 




























































































Das Funktionieren des Systems hing aber von der langfristigen Lebens- 
fahigkeit des Totalitarismus ab; sobald er zu zerbrockeln begann, betatigten 
sich die nationalen Kader zwangsweise als national gesinnte Fiihrungsschichen 
und begannen ihre Burger fiir die Interessen der Republiken und gegen den 
Zentrum zu mobilisieren. Klugerweise verwendeten sie die Argumentation 
und die Logik des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes, ein schon lange Jahre vom 
Westen zelebriertes Prinzip, wodurch natiirlich sowohl der Nationalismus als 
auch der Chauvinismus gefordert warden. Aus guten Griinden erschien der 
Nationalismus den neuesrstandenen Eliten in den ehemaligen Republiken und 
Satellitenstaaten als unentbehrliche Denk- und Handlungsweise (Motyl, p. 236).
2. The ethnic nature of political life
True to the belief that nationalism was the best antidote to communism and 
that it promised immediate political success with voters who had under “real 
socialism” lost any political sophistication, if they ever had any, and with non­
existent civil society, ethnic political parties were the first to be formed. Some 
politically ambitious non-nationalists used this stratagem. Such parties have 
aimed to rally all members of a given ethnic group and to exclude others. 
Even when ethnic exclusion is not explicitly stipulated in its statutes and its 
name, as, e.g. with the Democratic Party in Serbia, the nature of the party and 
its programme, deter all ethnically different citizens not eager to assimilate 
(Horowitz 1985, p. 291 )7. The objective of the party is basically the defence 
and promotion of the “national interest” taken in its ethnic meaning. This goes 
both for parties of the ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities. The manipula­
tive potentials of the “national interest” have proven to be enormous in the 
region (Dimitrijevic, 1994).
In a multinational state ethnic identification in name and programme is 
bound to produce debilitating effects. An extreme example, with tragic conse­
quences, was to be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There the outcome of the 
first multi-party elections in 1990 resulted in a “coalition government” of the 
Serb Democratic Party, the local branch of the Croat Democratic Community 
and the Party of Democratic Action, which was pronouncedly Muslim in all 
respects but name. At least two important non-nationalist parties took part in 
the elections, but were defeated. In an atmosphere of mistrust, the voters 
landed in an almost perfect prisoner's dilemma and many of them, in the last 
moment, switched their allegiance from political to national choice. The elec­
tions thus resembled a fateful census, where most voters cast their ballots for 
their respective national party. It was clear that the coalition of the three 
nationalist parties could not run the country: it eventually fell apart and party




























































































leaderships transformed themselves into headquarters of embattled paramili­
tary organisations.8 It was to be expected that the referendum for indepen­
dence, where the Croats and Moslems allied against the numerically inferior 
Serbs, would not be recognised by the latter: there had been a consensus 
among the nationalist leaders that the civic democracy would be replaced by 
communal arrangement; the elections and the resulting government belonged 
to the latter and the referendum to the old fashioned former category. One of 
the rules of the emerging communitarian order is that no ethic group is will­
ing to submit to any numerical majority of citizens.
For a distant observer, it is not easy to form a judgement as to the level of 
ethnic exclusiveness and nationalism in a political party: appearances might be 
neutral in comparison with the nationalist character of actual political and 
propaganda practice. In the post-totalitarian attempts of the local elites to pre­
serve their power, some communist parties have quite successfully developed 
into nationalist associations. Where this transformation was convincing, they 
have been more successful at elections. Thus the Communist Party of Mon­
tenegro, even before changing its name, won 64% of the popular vote in 
Montenegro in 1990 because it became closely identified with Serb national­
ism. The League of Communists of Serbia was probably the first communist 
party to become nationalist. Under a changed name (Socialist Party of Serbia) 
it managed to obtain 46% of the popular vote at the 1990 elections in Serbia. 
On the other hand, the former League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which by the almost equal ethnic distribution in the population and among its 
members had been prevented from becoming nationalist, scored only 8% of 
the popular vote. Another interesting development occurred in Croatia, where 
the former communists could not easily relinquish their anti-nationalist stance. 
Faced with intense nationalism of the leading Croat party, which eventually 
won the elections, non-Croat citizens (mostly Serbs) and non-nationalist Croats 
voted for the reformed communists (Party of Democratic Changes), so that 
this party scored respectable 23.6 %. However, it has not managed to exercise 
a corresponding influence after the elections. Confronted with ethnic anxieties, 
this party was too moderate for the Croats and the Serbs alike: it was sand­
wiched between aggressive Croat nationalist parties and the newly founded 
Serb Democratic Party, which identified itself only with the defence of the in­
terests of Serbs in Croatia (Goati, 1991).
In countries with strong national minorities mainstream political parties 
were unable to cross the ethnic divides. After the first multi-party elections, 
the second largest party represented in the Romanian Parliament was the
8 After two years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb “Republic Srpska” and the 
Croat “Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna” are for all practical purposes one-party para- 
states, under the absolute dominance of the Serb Democratic Party and the Croat 
Democratic Community, respectively. To a lesser degree the officially recognised 





























































































Democratic Union of Hungarians, with 7.2% of the popular vote - it ranked 
above the traditional National Liberal Party, which collected only 6.3%. In 
Serbia, Albanians boycotted three elections (1990 1992, 1993), whereas in 
Macedonia an Albanian party is strongly represented in the National Assem­
bly. In two elections, Hungarians in Serbia voted mostly for the Democratic 
Union of Vojvodina Hungarians, which came out stronger than some tradi­
tional Serbian parties. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which repre­
sents Turks in Bulgaria, and Omonia9 ( the Greek minority party in Albania) 
enlisted the votes of virtually all Turks and Greeks, respectively: they have a 
relatively strong position in the legislature. The circle of the politicisation of 
ethnic identity becomes thus complete.
Political allegiance and voting based exclusively on ethnic lines inherently 
contradict political pluralism and civil society. Communal values disappear or 
become very weak, both among the majority population and among minorities. 
Individuals are pushed not to act primarily as citizens but as members of the 
ethnic group10. They are induced not to recognise any social, economic, pro­
fessional and other interests and to behave as if all members of the ethnic 
group were in the same social position. Under such circumstances, there are 
few political parties or other associations that formulate common concerns and 
corresponding political claims that would transgress ethnic divisions and group 
citizens in various other combinations. In post communist multinational coun­
tries the latter have been singularly unsuccessful and isolated. Thus society 
gradually becomes blocked for progress and national elites get the opportunity 
to exploit their co-nationals in the name of global national goals.
Ethnonationalism operates also against ethnically identical political oppo­
nents and their associations. Under its pressure, all political organisations 
become gradually submitted to a “test” of patriotism and ethnic conformity. 
When, in the opinion of the self-appointed judges, a political party does not 
embrace a modicum of nationalism, it is subjected to damnation with a corre­
sponding epithet that includes the ubiquitous “anti-", but varies from country 
to country. In Romania, it is anti-Romanianism (Tismaneanu and Mihaies, p. 
25), in Serbia anti-Serbism, in Croatia, anti-Croatism etc. The animosity 
towards co-nationals with insufficiently developed ethnic feelings eventually
9 In a wave of anti-Greek feelings Omonia became regarded as a subversive organisation. 
Mobs attacked its offices and on 2 February 1992 it was officially prevented from 
fielding candidates in new elections. Some time later, ethnic Greeks established a new 
party, under the less revealing name of the “Union for Human Rights”. East European 
Reporter, vol. 5, no. 2, 1992, p. 36.
1(1 The following statement by Miroslav Toholj, one of the leaders of the Serb Democratic 
Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deserves to be quoted: “Serbs have been finally 
deprived of their Serb name, they have been made citizens, which they will not accept”. 




























































































becomes greater than hatred against aliens11 *. This results in wholesale regres­
sion in political life: some of the participants cease to be perceived as political 
opponents and become treacherous enemies, unworthy of respect and protec­
tion. Steven Lukes reminds us of a similar development of the slogan of 
fraternité after the French Revolution: it “acquired a new and ominous mean­
ing, promising violence first against non-brothers and then against false broth­
ers” (Lukes, p. 435).
Common interests are best realised and defended when they are perceived to 
be in jeopardy. The tribal instinct is therefore most probably the result of fear 
for national identity, which overshadows all other considerations. Nationalist 
regimes have always shown strong resilience vis-à-vis economic sanctions 
(Dimitrijevic - Pejic). The latter are meant to induce rational reactions, but 
nationalist sentiments are not rational: under their influence people are pre­
pared to sacrifice “vulgar” rational interests in favour of “noble” irrational 
demands of national survival, dignity and sovereignty. Abstract anxiety is 
permeating most societies in post-communist transition: “fear of yesterday, 
fear of today, and fear of tomorrow” (Miszlivetz, p. 19). The defence of the 
ethnic group has become the primary concern.
3. Nationalism and human rights
Extreme nationalism poses a serious threat to human rights. Authorities 
hesitate to offer protection of life and limb against “patriotic” hooligans, or, 
even worse, use them as accessories. Freedom of association becomes 
restricted to a circle of nationally acceptable groups. Laws against defamation, 
slander and libel do not operate and :he freedom of expression becomes the 
property of the ruling elite. On the other hand, editors of publications belong­
ing to the opposition are denounced as alien hirelings13. Incitement to national 
hatred is not only tolerated but officially encouraged. The climax is reached in
11 Lack of national feeling (“ethnic atheism”) is generally considered to be abnormal and 
treacherous.. One Ostoja Sibincic, leader of a group of Serb refugees from Croatia, has 
become famous for saying that some Serbs are “more qualified” (kvalitetniji) than others. 
Sibincic is a simple man, but not so Zoran Djindjic, doctor of philosophy, translator of 
Husserl and leader of the verbally moderate and supposedly non-nationalist Democratic 
Party: “There have always been statistical Serbs who have been more catholic than the 
Pope, and less Serb than Croats” (AW, 8 April 1994, p. 7).
Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the ultra-rightist Serbian Radical Party, who then supported 
the incumbent President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, against Milan Panic, who was 
regarded as moderate and pro-Western, made the following statement after the results of 
the December 1992 elections: “For him (i.e. Panic) voted Hungarians, Albanians, Croats, 
Muslims and other treacherous strata”, Borba (Belgrade), 25 December 1992, p. 4. From 
the results, it was obvious that many ethnic Serbs had voted for Panic.




























































































military hostilities among states reduced to their ethnic component. As illus­
trated by examples from former Yugoslavia and the former USSR, horrible 
passions generated by nationalism cannot be restrained by humanitarian law: 
they result in extreme cruelty to combatants and sufferings of the civilian 
population. The tendency of every civil war not to heed the status of civilians 
is exacerbated by hostility toward all members of the other ethnic group, 
which is the first step toward genocide.
Apart from bringing a vague feeling of relief - nationalist parties are proud 
of “having restored dignity to the nation” - post-communist nationalism is a 
combination of visceral ethnocentrism and some features of communist rule. It 
is a substitute ideology in times of peril and impatience: by identifying 
(ethnically alien) scapegoats for failures in the recent past and the near future 
it can restore the mythical glories of distant history and sustain insecure politi­
cal elites even when they are unable to formulate clear social and economic 
programmes.
4. The post-communist nation state and minorities
The “socialist” state, which in many respects favoured the “working class” 
but in legal terms did not as a rule prescribe or condone discrimination on any 
ground but political opinion, was thus generally replaced by an outwardly lib­
eral democratic state, which in its mildest form is heavily loaded in favour of 
the dominant ethnic group. Most post-communist states in East and Central 
Europe are based on strict adherence to the ethnonationalist idea of the “nation 
state” as a state primarily “belonging” to the dominant, most numerous, 
“historic", “constituent", “state building” etc. nation. Members of other ethnic 
groups are in most cases formally recognised, declared equal and protected, 
but essentially treated as an anomaly, or tolerated as historic “guests"14 Even 
in situations when the latter do not fear loss of citizenship (nationality) or dis­
crimination, the political “message", explicitly or implicitly reflected in the 
constitution and various laws, is that they cannot claim to influence the vital 
affairs of the state, it being the achievement of historical aspirations of one 
(ethnic) nation and the most important means for the protection of is funda­
mental interests, such as survival, independence, culture etc.
As a result of this, nationality as a link between an individual and his/her 
ethnic group (nation) has been either confused with nationality as a link
Cf. Chapter I of the Constitution of Croatia, Preamble of the Constitution of Macedonia, 
Preamble of the Constitution of Serbia, art. 1, 4 and 6 of the Constitution of Romania, 
Preamble of the Constitution of the Ukraine, Preamble and art. 3 and 5 of the 
Constitution of Slovenia, art. 6 of the Constitution of Hungary. For further elaboration 




























































































between a citizen and his/her state (German Staatsangehorigkeit), or the first 
has taken precedence over the latter, even in legal terms. litis  mother-child 
relationship results in dubious law. In. Latvia and Estonia, it is expected that 
the ethnically different former citizens of the USSR, after having been denied 
citizenship of those reconstituted states, would not become stateless but only 
alien, because they belong to the state suggested by their ethnicity. Their elites 
suffering from the same disorder, each nation must have a home, and one 
home only. In its aggressive form, such thinking results in dreams about the 
“great” state: Great Serbia, Great Croatia, Great Hungary, Great Bulgaria and, 
yes, Great Albania, etc. In the defensive mode it is a cry for at least some sec­
tion of the Earth wholly owned by the nation, which ethnic aliens are invited 
to leave and join “their” states:
Latvia is the only home country for the ethnic Latvians, the only place in the 
world where they can exercise their statehood. Whereas any representative of 
the other ethnic groups living in Latvia, most of whom are economic mi­
grants, who is not satisfied with the provisions of the Baltic legislation regard­
ing treatment of non-Balts or insufficient representation in the structures of 
power, can still return to their respective national states where they can exer­
cise their national political rights of self-determination (sic) (Bojars, 342)15
Provisions of many post-communist constitutions stress the duty of the state 
to assist ethnic co-nationals abroad, although they are foreign nationals 
(citizens)16. Apart from being highly questionable under international law, 
such provisions cannot but add to the isolation and estrangement of national 
minorities in the countries where they live: they gradually become more 
“alien” and their leaders start corresponding to the nationalist-extremist cliché 
of “traitors” and “foreign agents".
In countries that had kept a national image under “socialism” and which 
were named after the dominant nation this process has strengthened or exag­
gerated the ethnic features of the state. However, it was disastrous for multi­
national federations. They, at least constitutionally, did not recognise the 
supremacy of one nation. Of the three “socialist” federations, two, Yugoslavia 
and the USSR, collapsed almost immediately, and the third, Czecho-Slovakia, 
could not survive even in a reconstructed, liberal version. It seems that post­
communist nationalism cannot tolerate the idea of a multinational state, let 
alone a state that is “anational”. To be sure, some observers believe that the
Note the supreme importance of the right to self-determination, which seems to comprise 
all individual rights.
16 Cf. e.g. art. 6 (3) of the Constitution of Hungary, art. 6(1) of the Constitution of 
Romania and art 72 (2) of the Constitution of Serbia. The most outspoken in this respect 
is art. 10 of the second draft of the Constitution of Albania: ‘The Republic of Albania 
looks after the recognition of national and democratic rights of the Albanian population 




























































































creation of civil society in a multinational state is fraught with insurmountable 
difficulties:
In einer ethnisierten, politisierten und menschenrechtsbewussten Atmospha- 
re ist die Schaffung von sich nicht gegenseitig bekampfenden Institutionen 
schwer, wenn nicht sogar unmoglich (Motyl, p. 239).
This invites interesting comparisons with post-fascist states, which retained 
their multi-ethnicity (Spain), reverted to (non-ethnic) federalism (Germany) 
or introduced considerable autonomy and decentralisation (Italy). On the other 
hand, in Slovenia, where before the collapse of Yugoslavia, the civil sociaty 
and alternative movements had seemed to be strong and flourishing, the advent 
of the hypemational state has swept them from the political and social scene17.
5. Types of ethnic minorities
Generally speaking, in the post communist period the minorities that had 
been recognised, acknowledged or tolerated in pre-communist times were 
joined by new ethnic entities, some of them finding it difficult to accommodate 
to the status of a minority.
a. Migrant workers
In other parts of the world, migrant workers are considered as the foremost 
candidates for new minorities. This does not seem to be the case in East and 
Central Europe. To be sure, foreigners came to work in some of the better 
developed countries of real socialism, especially from corresponding countries 
in Asia. However, they were there under “fraternal” interstate arrangements, 
as groups and not as individuals. They were the first to experience 
“communist” xenophobia: in their case, traditional racism was fused with the 
distaste of their “friendly” country of origin, such as Vietnam or North Korea 
(Dimitrijevic, 1993, p. 40). Low standard of living and unemployment make 
most post communist states unattractive to foreign labour. However, there was 
a tendency within multi-ethnic “socialist” states to seek work and settle in the 
more developed areas, such as the Baltic republics in the USSR and Slovenia in 
Yugoslavia. New governments there adamantly refuse to recognise such 
migrant workers as established minorities. In Slovenia, for instance, only the 
two “autochtonous” and “historic” minorities of the Italians and Hungarians
17 See the statement of the Slovene sociologist and philossopher Rastko Mocnik in Nedeljna 




























































































are officially recognised but not the more numerous Croats, Serbs and 
Moslems who settled there permanently under Yugoslavia18
b. Persons identifying with a wider state frame
The experience of multinational states and “anational” federations together 
with the communist experiment of substituting class and ideological allegiance 
for national ties have weakened the national consciousness in a number of 
individuals. Now a person refusing ethnic identification (an ethnic “atheist") 
for the nationalists is either inconceivable, treacherous or outright crazy.19 
Aggregations of such individuals can be numerically important. Not only are 
such people to be found in countries of immigration outside Europe, but they 
have emerged in multinational states in Europe.
In Yugoslavia it was possible to state “Yugoslav” as national belonging, and 
in 1981 about 6% of the population, or 1,219,045 persons, declared them­
selves as such.20 They have no place in the new nationalist set-up and are 
treated with utmost suspicion. It is interesting that the Constitution of Croatia 
expressly recognises a number of very small ethnic groups, but does not men­
tion the Yugoslavs, although in the census conducted in Croatia after the 
proclamation of that act the Yugoslav group proved to be the second non- 
Croat group in numerical strength: Yugoslavs comprised 2.2% of the popula­
tion, double as much as the Muslims listed second (after the Serbs) in the 
Constitution21. According to the Croatian electoral laws, all candidates have to 
indicate their (ethno)nationality after their name: at the July 1992 elections, 
Yugoslavs were recognisable by the indication that they were “undecided"22. 
“Undecided” people cannot organise, they have no common origin or separate
18 Art. 5 and 64 of the Constitution of Slovenia. At the latest census there were 3.064 ethnic 
Italians and 8.503 ethnic Hungarians in Slovenia. On the other hand, there were 54.212 
Croats, 47.911 Serbs and 26.842 Muslims (Marko, pp. 2-3).
19 In his ideal type or “caricature” of Communitaria Lukes deals also with deviants: 
“Recalcitrant individuals have been known to reject the category by which they are 
identified or to pretend that they don't belong to it. Some cross or refuse to acknowledge 
the identifying boundaries, and some even reject the very idea of such boundaries. Non-, 
ex- trans-, and anti-identifiers are not the happiest people in Communitaria. They feel 
uneasy because they tend to be seen as “not true Communitarians”, as disloyal, even as 
‘rootless cosmopolitans’.” (Lukes, pp. 429-430).
20 Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1988, Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1988, p. 
122.
21 Contrary to widespread beliefs, “Yugoslavism” was officially discouraged already in 
1981, which could also be inferred from the instructions given to the census takers 
(Liebich 1992, p. 36). This can be explained by creeping nationalism, which found its 
first expression in the “confederal” 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia.




























































































language or other features related to ethnicity and thus cannot claim minority 
status2*.
There was much ado about the “Soviet man” in the USSR (Jevtuch, 249), but 
such people were not registered at censuses. Chances are, however, that many 
members of the “Russian speaking” minorities in non-Slavic states in the terri­
tory of the former Soviet Union (Central Asia, the Baltic republics) feel 
vaguely “Soviet", the way they had felt to be “Rossiiski", and not Russian, in 
the Russian Empire ("Rossia"), Many of them are not Russian, but Byelorus­
sian, Ukrainian etc.24. They have been generally described by the language 
they speak, and Russian used to be the lingua-franca of the Soviet Union. As 
exemplified by the nationality (citizenship) debate in Estonia and Latvia, Rus­
sian speakers do not seem to be accepted as a minority. Instead they are 
offered either statelessness or the nationality of Russia. In the latter case they 
would become aliens linked to a country that might not be the most germane in 
the ethnic sense.
c. Old majorities becoming new minorities
Close to those who identified only with the wider framework of the state are 
persons who after its dissolution find themselves reduced from members of a 
recognised constituent nation to persons belonging to a national minority. 
Especially dramatic are the psychological and political effects of this change 
for those who used to identify themselves with the most numerous and (at least 
culturally) dominant nations. The best examples seem to be the Russians and 
the Serbs. In the Soviet Union, the former used to feel at ease in the whole 
territory, where their language was official and readily spoken. Their 
“comfortable” position seems to have been taken for granted (and was per­
ceived by others as arrogance) - no federal unit was exclusively “Russian” and, 
what was probably politically most important, there was no Russian section of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Millions of Russians find themselves 
now outside Russia, where they have been treated either as a national minority 
or as aliens, in most cases as unwelcome reminders of communism, which they 
allegedly imposed. This impression was strengthened by the haughty attitude 
of some of them, who persisted to consider themselves as an elite and refused 
to adapt to local customs, respect local traditions, learn the local language etc.
Serbs in Yugoslavia were scattered through the territory of that state. In the 
republic named Serbia they comprised about two-thirds of the population, but 
they lived in considerable numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Mon­
tenegro. Only Montenegro remained within the reduced state of Yugoslavia. 
The other former republics - now independent and sovereign states - have
2^ “Fortunately, they (the non-conforming Communitarians) are few and unorganized. Least 
of ail are they likely to form another subcommunity” (Lukes, p. 430).




























































































treated Serbs as a national minority (Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia) or are 
believed to be dominated by non-Serbs (Bosnia-Herzegovina). In those new 
states, where Serbs form a considerable part of the population (Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina), reduction to a national minority was experienced as 
humiliating degradation, especially if it was accompanied by triumphant 
nationalism of the government. No dialogue is possible between a government 
that offers only to tolerate alien and unwelcome guests (free to leave if they 
are not happy) and the leaders of an ethnic group for whom any minority 
status, even the most favourable, is anathema.
To complicate this, dreams about “great” states concern territory only, and 
not its inhabitants. This is the first step toward ethnic cleansing. Territorial 
claims based on history implicitly admit that one's own nation is presently not 
in the majority. Everything is done to explain this by historical injustices, 
especially if they are attributable to communism and other international con­
spiracies.25 One of the Davin C. Pugh's famous “Seven Rules of Nationalism” 
posits that: “If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us - they 
must be protected against your oppression".
d. “Artificial nations” and “communist inventions"
A common feature of all exclusive nationalisms has been to deny the exis­
tence of “uncomfortable” ethnic groups or nations. This applies to religiously 
“estranged” peoples, such as the Adzaris in Georgia26, Muslims in Yugoslavia 
and Pomaks in Bulgaria (Liebich, p. 34). The existence of Macedonians has 
been rejected by Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nationalists alike27. Many 
Ukrainians, including some former dissidents and human rights activists, reso­
lutely deny the existence of Ruthenians suggesting that the matter of Ruthenian 
national identity be submitted to an arbitration of historians and ethnologists. 
It is not great news then to learn that Tatar leaders reject separate Bashkir 
identity (Sheehy, p. 34). Nationalists vie for seniority and have ancient claims: 
they seem to hold that there existed historical deadlines for the creation of 
nations, after which no applicants can be considered. Is it to be believed that in
25 See Ekmecic. Its is interesting that this Serb historian gives the expressions ius soli and 
ius sanguinis unexpected meanings. Dealing with the motives of European powers in 
relation to the Yugoslav crisis he writes: “France sacrificed her principle that national 
rights are defined according to the right to land (“droit de sol”) and accepted the German 
formula of the ‘right of blood”’(p. 25)
26 “Georgia was proclaimed as a 'national state of Georgians and Abkhazians', but not of 
Ossetians, Adzaris or Meskhetian Turks!” (Tishkov 1992, p. 59).
27 In the eyes of successive Bulgarian governments “Macedonians are in fact Bulgarians 




























































































the future no new ethnic groups would emerge, or at least groups with a new 
identity?28
Complaints about “artificial nations” are a favourite part of the nationalists' 
rhetoric and reflect their fear of proliferation of subversive groups. To be 
sure, their argument carries some weight in former communist countries, for 
the invention and fragmentation of ethnic groups was a method of governance 
through the “Marxist solution of the national question". A good example was 
the Soviet attempt to create a Moldovan, separate from Romanian, nation, 
supported by the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet (Liebich, p. 34).
On the other hand, it is easily forgotten that internationalist communists 
were, at least initially, liberal in their attitudes toward small and oppressed 
ethnic groups and that they gave some of them the first historical chance to 
claim separate identity (Jevtuch, p. 249; Motyl, p. 235). As aptly observed by 
Mullerson, “they (i.e. socialist states) saw in individual rights and freedoms a 
clear and certain threat to their power, which granting some language or cul­
tural rights to minorities did not do” (p. 796). Minority rights under the 
“really existing socialism” were not adequate substitutes for absent civil and 
political rights, which the minorities lacked, well as majorities. A„ soon as a 
minority group was perceived to be “treacherous” or “anti-socialist” horrible 
collective measures followed: such as those in the USSR against Chechens, the 
Ingushies, the Crimean Tartars, the Volga Germans and the Meskhetian Turks. 
Government considerations were obviously related to security: as a rule, 
minute and isolated ethnic groups were better tolerated than parts of poten­
tially dangerous larger nations: thus, for instance, the German minority was 
ignored everywhere in Central and East Europe, except in Romania.
To simple minds, individuals who genuinely believe to belong to newly 
recognised ethnic groups are not only “national traitors", but illegitimate chil­
dren of communism, as well. In non-communist Greece, the common wisdom 
is that the Macedonian nation was “created” by Tito, above all to harm the 
Greeks.29 Macedonia is seen as a security threat, so that old efforts to assimi­
late Slavs in Greek Macedonia, dating from pre-communist times, are now
28 In the former Soviet Union, claims to nationhood by “strong cultural minorities and small 
Northern peoples”, such as the Gagauz, Karpato-Russians and Siberian Tatars' are being 
rejected even by the most liberal authors (Tishkov 1992, 50).
29 The Preamble of the 1991 Constituuon of Macedonia refers to the “cultural, spiritual and 
state heritage of the Macedonian people” and “especially to the state and legal traditions of 
the Krusevo Republic and the historical decisions of ASNOM (the Anti-Fascist Council 
of National Liberation of Macedonia)”. Tito may have influenced the latter, but the short­
lived Republic of Krusevo was proclaimed in 1903 and the leading political group active 




























































































compounded by fears of communism30. National characters, so dear to a na­
tionalist, are easily related to political attitudes: in nationalist environments it 
is easy to speak of “liberal", “communist", “progressive” or “retrograde” etc. 
nations.31
e. The fate of minorities not recognised under “real socialism"
Almost all post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe have 
failed to upgrade ethnic groups that had no standing under the communist 
system. In a society permeated by nationalism and national concerns, this 
should be more important than in the nationally subdued communist system. 
Characteristic is the stubborn refusal to recognise Gypsies as a national 
minority or even a respectable ethnic group.32 This goes hand in hand with 
extreme anti-Gypsy feelings, which are accompanied by persistent attempts to 
reduce the statistical importance of the Roma community33.
f. The reduction of rights of recognised minorities
Some minorities enjoyed, at least in some “socialist” states, nominal and 
formal rights. These rights were mostly cultural and linguistic ar.d looked 
better than those in most ether states. This specially applied to wide territorial 
autonomy of the areas principally inhabited by a minority, in the form of 
autonomous provinces and regions. In fact, it was in the nature of the com­
munist totalitarianism to deal with minorities principally in a territorial con­
text, where it was easier to control and did not imply personal privileges34 
However, in some countries the language of the minority was freely used 
throughout the territory of the state and in the highest institutions.
The majorities in new and reformed states find that this status should be cut 
to proportions that they consider normal. For security and “state” reasons 
autonomies have become intolerable and cultural and linguistic rights contra-
30 Greece has been long familiar with the category of “slavophone Greeks” and in the early 
fifties a government decree decided to settle the northern territories “with new colonists 
with healthy national consciousness” (Mullerson, p. 796-797)
31 The newest contribution is by Radovan Karadzic, the president of the “Republic Srpska”: 
according to him “Japanese are an objective nation, who appreciate Serbs”.
32 The only exception seems to be the Preamble of the 1991 Constitution of Macedonia, 
which defines that State as the “national State of the Macedonian people, which 
guarantees ... permanent coexistence of the Macedonian people with Albanians, Turks, 
Wallachians, Rom a and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia” 
(emphasis added). The Constitution of Slovenia promises to regulate by law the special 
position of Roma in that country (Art. 65).
33 According to the 1977 census, there were only 230,000 Roma in Romania. Now, a 
slightly higher official figure is presented, but the estimates of their true numbers vary 
from 300.000 to 5 million! (Liebich 1992, p. 39)
34 The “non-territorial” Jews were a problem in the USSR and elsewhere in the “socialist 




























































































diet the “nation-ness” of the post-communist nation state, which tends to be 
hypemational. The first act of the national-communist regime in Serbia was to 
abolish the autonomous provinces of Kosovo (with an Albanian majority) and 
Vojvodina (with a multiethnic composition and the Serbs accounting for 50 
percent of the population). The official use of the minority languages was 
restricted to areas “where nationalities (minorities) live, and in accordance 
with the law” (Art. 8 (2) of the Constitution). In turn, the Law on the Official 
Use of the Language and the Alphabet35 delegates to municipalities the deci­
sion as to whether nationalities live in their territory and which languages are 
to be used (Art. 11). One of the new limitations is that exclusively the Serbian 
version of the toponymes and personal names is to be used on public signs. 
The only concession to the minority is the possibility to use the spelling appro­
priate to its language and alphabet (Art. 7)36.
Sole reference to constitutional and legal provisions reducing the status of 
the minorities does not fully reflect what the latter perceive to be the deterio­
ration of their position. References to international standards are no consola­
tion, especially when the change occurs in the realm of policies, based on the 
same general provisions. Thus, for instance, the Serbian Law on Radio and 
Television stipulates that “Radio-Television Novi Sad prepares and produces 
radio and television programme for the territory of the Autonomous Province 
of Vojvodina in Serbo-Croat and the languages of nationalities” (Art. 20 (2)). 
The time allocated at Novi Sad stations to broadcasts in minority (nationality) 
languages has been reduced in February 1993 - for reasons of economy, 
according to the government appointed management. The representatives of 
the Association of Slovaks, Romanians and Ruthenians in Yugoslavia were of a 
different view:
Under the pretext that information in the languages of minorities is “above 
European and world standards", many programmes have been abolished - 
those in particular, which have contributed most to the preservation of the 
national identities and which have been the most popular. If, in time of general 
economic crisis, it is minority rights that suffer first, this cannot be called 
economy, but discrimination.37
All minorities, old and new, have to live in a surrounding of boastful refer­
ences to the superiority of the dominant nation, to its past glories and victories 
(not infrequently over the nations to which minorities belong) and amid a 
rhetoric of deprecation, derision and hate. They are exposed to menacing 
projects of future restriction and exclusion and, what is most disturbing, to 
incitement to national and religious hatred that goes unpunished. Article 20(2) 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which obligates its
35 Sluzbeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 45/1991.
3^ For other examples see Hobsbawm 1992, p. 185 ff.




























































































signatories to “prohibit by law” “any advocacy of national, racial and religious 
hatred” has been as a rule implemented by the successors to the former 
communist states parties very literally: such laws do exist but are not put in 
practice.
6. Imaginable outcomes
Irrespective of their dimensions and proportions, nonmembers of the state 
nation are, in the post communist hypemational state, de facto  or de iure 
minorities. If they are not less numerous than the state nation or if their 
numerical inferiority is not striking, as, e.g. in Lstonia or Latvia, then they 
are clearly in a non-dominant position, which is another criterion for a 
minority (Capotorti). Almost all countries in the region are multiethnic but 
are very reluctant to admit this officially. Determined nation states have 
replaced federated states and autonomies, where they existed. There is no such 
thing as an anational or multinational post communist state.
It is quite clear then that settlements like power sharing or, in the taxonomy 
of McGarry and O'Leary (p. 4), “consociationalism” are very unlikely in the 
near future. One can only hope that all minorities would be recognised and 
granted adequate individual and collective rights.
If we turn again to the new and old minorities described above, we shall 
note that they invite various reactions from the post communist nationalist 
majorities and their governments. They mostly belong to the time tested meth­
ods of eliminating rather than managing ethnic differences but can have dif­
ferent results in terms of human cost and suffering.
Elimination of minorities by assimilation, which eventually destroys an eth­
nic group while preserving or even, in the eyes of the dominant group, elevat­
ing persons belonging to it, does not seem to be available to all minorities in 
all post communist states. Assimilation has been offered on the combined cri­
teria of nature and size so that efforts toward assimilation will most likely be 
aimed at smaller groups of ethnically “estranged” people. In former multina­
tional federations all successor nation states hope that those who opted for 
statist supranationalism, i.e. identification with the larger state, would recog­
nise their fallacy and return to their “natural” ethnic fold. However, only those 
who have reason to claim that they belong to the nation ruling the state where 
they live will be properly assimilated - others would become part of the 
national minority of their ethnic co-nationals^* and would be treated as such.
3* E.g. “Yugoslavs” who, by operation of the Slovene Act on Nationality (Uradni list 




























































































One would expect that the same would apply to all “artificial” nations, the 
logic being the same: they allegedly forgot their true national identity owing to 
pernicious foreign influences. It is this where the numerical and security cri­
teria emerge. Small minorities of that kind, such as e.g. Pomaks and Macedo­
nians in Bulgaria, are offered assimilation but larger and more coherent 
groups are not. In spite of the Serb and Croat rhetoric that Muslim Slavs in 
Yugoslavia are in fact islamised Serbs or Croats, Muslims have not been 
encouraged by the Serb and Croat states to assimilate by the simple device of 
adopting the corresponding version of Christianity.39 Absorbing too many 
newcomers would threaten to dilute or “pollute” the nation allegedly softened 
by years of “cosmopolitanism".
In all other cases the suggested and applied methods of regulation tend to be 
less merciful. To borrow again from McGarry and O'Leary, the overall ten­
dency is towards management in the form of hegemonic control or to elimina­
tion in the form of mass population transfers (pp. 9, 23). Old minorities are 
tolerated as de facto second rate citizens, their rights acquired under “really 
existing socialism” are being abolished or reduced, they are kept far from 
important decision-making and expected to loyally recognise the general 
supremacy of the state nation. Thus, they approach the former position of the 
officially unrecognised de facto minorities. As to the members of the formerly 
dominant or equal “titular” nations, they are officially treated as old minorities 
but, sometimes for their size and sometimes because of their resistance to what 
they perceive as degradation, regarded with distrust and apprehension. In 
Latvia and Estonia the tendency is to prevent them from acquiring nationality 
and to regard them as aliens, which inevitably implies the possibility of indi­
vidual or collective expulsion.
Mass transfer and exchange of populations appears to be the secret and 
sometimes not so secret dream of many nationalist leaders. Not only was 
“ethnic cleansing” in the form of forcing and inducing new minorities to leave 
been practised in many places, and particularly in former Yugoslavia, but it 
has been accompanied by high sounding rationalisations coming from 
respected intellectuals and learned institutions. In their eyes the Yugoslav 
experience allegedly indicated that common life was impossible and that 
Yugoslav ethnic nations should totally separate in order to live peacefully in 
new ethnically purer neighbouring states4". “Humane resettlement” appears to 
be the current euphemism41
in Slovenia at the time of independence cannot declare themselves as ethnic Yugoslavs 
any more: depending on their origin, they became Slovenes, Serbs, Croats etc.
39 For many educated atheist Muslims this would be a bewildering choice.
49 In his message of 26 March 1992 to the “Congress of Serb Intellectuals in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, which convened on the very eve of the outbreak of large scale hostilities in 
that Yugoslav Republic, the famous Serb writer Dobrica Cosic wrote, inter alia: 
“Respecting historical experiences and the current situation prevailing among us, we, 




























































































Genocide is the remaining radical method of eliminating ethnic differences. 
Although some operations in Yugoslavia and elsewhere had genocidal elements 
and nationalist authorities appeared to have condoned them by not investigat­
ing or prosecuting the perpetrators42. Open advocacy and policy of genocide 
has been avoided, less because of the domestic than of the international public 
opinion, to which most post communist hypernational states, being relatively 
small, must grudgingly adapt.
The post-communist nation state is, at its mildest, a state of latent discrimi­
nation. Even when official ethnic differentiation is rare, the “spirit” of the 
constitutions and laws signals to members of all minorities that they are infe­
rior citizens, submitted to frequent tests of loyalty43. Whereas the level of 
individual rights has generally increased in most such states, the protection of 
the minorities has shrunk. Politically and psychologically this creates tensions, 
anxiety and doubtful allegiance which results in political instability and uncer­
tainty of human rights in general.
to remove the reasons for hate and killings and in order to be able tomorrow to unite with 
fewer obstacles in all that is rational and useful for all of us” (Vreme, 4. April 1994, p. 
15 - the pomposity and length of the sentence have been deliberately retained in 
translation). Two months later Cosic was elected first President of the reconstructed 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia only to be unceremoniously impeached hardly after a 
year in office by a Parliament loyal to the Serbian President Milosevic.
4 1 See Nedeljna Borba, 9-10 April 1994, pp. II-III. Under the strong influence of reports 
by writers and travelers on the alleged barbaric past and eternal ethnic and religious 
enmity in Bosnia some Western authors advocate civilised resettlement: “In reality, 
where... peoples cannot coexist tolerably, and minority status is impractable (sic), then 
they have to separate. This is bound to be very bad for many of them, but it does not 
have to mean civil war. Had the outside world more readily recognized the disruptive 
consequence of dissolving the Bosnian protectorate, and been ready earlier on actively to 
assist the resettlement of its communities, then things might (at least) have been better 
than they presently are” (Naim, p. 408). This presupposes pressure from below on wise 
and concerned nationalist leadership and does not take into account that “clean” territory 
is claimed also where co-nationals are a minority. Orderly transfer of populations is 
conceivable only after borders have been decided by some superior authority (the United 
Nations?) or, more probably, by the force of arms. It is therefore unlikely that things 
might have been better. See supra, 5 c.
42 One was the abduction of 19 passengers, all apparently ethnic Moslems from Serbia, 
from a Yugoslav train transiting through the territory occupied by Bosnian Serb forces, 
on 27 February 1993. In spite of the solemn promises of the President of Serbia that they 
would be found and the culprits punished there has been no progress in the investigation 
and the abducted persons are presumed to be dead. Vreme, 28 February 1994, p. 9.
43 Persons not belonging to the “state nation” are being constantly being reminded of their 
potential disloyalty. In a series of self-administered tests, published by the popular 
Zagreb weekly Globus, the Croats were graded as to their “quality” and the Serbs as to 
their loyalty. Serbs scored negatively if they thought e.g. that Belgrade was “more 
beautiful and cleaner” than Zagreb or if they were fans of a Serbian soccer club. Borba, 
22 April 1993, p. 17. This is to be compared with the statement of Sinisa Vucinic, the 
leader of a militant pro-regime rightist group in Serbia: “Serbia shall not be the state of 





























































































The post communist ethnic syndrome has brought about - rather belatedly, 
one might say - a flurry of activity of various international organisations in 
Europe. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has 
produced an impressive body of “soft law” relating to national and other 
minorities44. Both the Council of Europe and the European Union have been 
concerned with the minority issues, sometimes duplicating their efforts (Wille; 
Bloed 1994). In comparison, the United Nations has to its credit a modest body 
of hard law regarding discrimination and related matters but there seems to 
have been little willingness and imagination to apply it to all minority situa­
tions45. The common belief, shared by many governments, is that Art. 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights remains the only 
authoritative text. The latter is, however, a result of the post World War II 
situation where collective rights were distrusted in favour of settling minority 
issues in terms of the individual rights of persons belonging to minorities. The 
recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (18 December 1992) is in the 
same vein and, in spite of some advances, remains “soft law", rigged with 
“phrases like 'where appropriate', 'where required', 'wherever possible', 
'encourage conditions', 'create favourable conditions’, and 'in a manner not 
incompatible with national legislation'” (Alfredsson, p. 78).
In terms of norm setting the existing CSCE documents appear to be largely 
satisfying in essence but not in form. TTiey would have to be more understand­
able and systematic in order to be promoted to international norms. Too great 
a dependence of citizens on their national affiliation contradicts the principle 
of non-discrimination, prevents the participation of all of them in political and 
economic life and causes unrest among persons not belonging to dominant na­
tions. It would be in the interest of the new nation states to respect the rights 
acquired under the previous non-national or multinational state to the greatest 
extent. They could consider to recognise the right of option, as it has been 
applied to nationality (citizenship) in modern peace treaties (Kunz 1930; Kunz 
1947).
Similar suggestions cannot come in terms of rules of international law and 
commands by international organisations and conferences (although some 
inter-ethnic “peace treaties” have to be mediated by them) but in terms of 
domestic law and policies, where informed foreign advice would be extremely 
helpful. Some assistance of this concrete, political nature has been provided by 
the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and this is why his per­
44 Relevant documents are reproduced in the valuable collection of Bloed, 1993.




























































































formance in only one year after the creation of the post has been enthusiasti­
cally received (Bloed 1994, p. 82).
This raises the possibility of outside arbitration in inter-ethnic and minority 
affairs. To a certain extent, arbitration was envisaged under the League of 
Nations system of minorities treaties, which was allowed to lapse with the 
emergence of the United Nations. One of the reasons of dissatisfaction was that 
minorities treaties created obligations only for some politically disadvantaged 
“infant countries carved out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's corpse” (Farer 
- Gaer, p. 243). Curiously, but expectedly, these very states are now in the 
post communist category. As intimated by their reaction to the draft “Pact on 
Stability in Europe", launched by the French prime minister Balladur early in 
1993 (Bloed 1994) they would probably resist any arrangement designed only 
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